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0.- INTRODUCTION 
The rural associationism developed from the last decades of the XIX century could be 
consider as an answer of the agriculturists to the increasing integration of agriculture in the 
market, and to the effects of the Great Depression. In the case of Spain, the initiatives in this 
sense arose with certain delay in relation to the countries of Western Europe. This 
phenomenon originated in the Nineties, when in some European states the cooperative 
organisations were widely spread and the associative movement was consolidated enough in 
Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France and Italy. In Germany, in 1898, the total number of 
cooperatives was 14,200, of which 3,667 were small farm loan banks, reaching in 1905 the 
number of 23,700 and 10,909 of them were small farm loan banks1. In France2, in the same 
year, the number of small farm loan banks of all types was 1645, and the number of 
agricultural unions in 1900 was of 2069. In Italy3, in 1898, there were 904 small farm loan 
banks (594 of them were popular banks), being in 1907 a total of 2428 saving banks (with the 
829 popular banks). In Denmark4, in 1898, the organisations had federated at national level in 
the Central Cooperative Committee that included (among others) such sectors as butter-shops, 
slaughter houses, dairies, feeding stuffs, etc… in 1900 there were 1029 cooperatives 
specialised in the butter production. In Austria5 in 1904 there existed 16 regional institutes 
and 4021 cooperatives and the set of Empire 7082 (without Hungary). Finally, in Belgium6 
the Government had founded the Comptoirs agricoles in 1884. They were offices of 
agricultural credit connected with the savings banks and the cooperative small farm loan 
banks. And they reached a total of 335 entities in 1898 with 572 professional or agricultural 
unions.  
                                                          
1 For Germany, see M. Prinz (2002) and Narciso Noguer (1912), p. 270-287. 
2 Pierre Lehman (1979), p. 47 and M.C. Cleary (1989), p. 35. 
3 Giuseppe Micheli (1898), p. 56; Institut International Agricole (1914), pp. 535-552 and N. Noguer 
(1913), p. 369. 
4 A. Gascón y Miramón (1926), p. 63 and p.212; I. Henriksen (1998) 
5 N. Noguer (1913), p.323 
6 M. Turmann (1908), p. 151. 
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The beginning of the Spanish cooperativism is closely bound to the Law of 1906. It 
granted the agrarian cooperatives with fiscal exemptions and other types of supports to the 
associates, although the process did not really accelerate until the promulgation of the law 
regulation in 1908. The official database is very problematic and with little reliability7 and, 
therefore, the statistics are due to handle with extreme precaution. 
The performance of the Public Administration8, related to the application of the 
mentioned law, had negative repercussions on the Spanish cooperative movement. It caused 
the dissolution of numerous organisations that could not obtain the fiscal exemptions or the 
official recognition that allowed them to accede on the official credit (Central Bank of Spain). 
This failure produced among the agriculturists a great distrust against the organisations that 
left indebted their members9. It was the first lost opportunity to lay the foundation of an ample 
and solid network of cooperatives. 
Since 1915, the foundation of cooperatives received a renewed impulse due to the impact 
of the military conflict on the Spanish agriculture. The landlords impelled to organise small 
farmers into credit cooperatives (f.e. in Castilla-León) with the purpose of searching for 
supports and pressing to the State to make it increase the protectionism in the cereal sector. 
Also in the years 1918-1920 this interesting collaboration will be reinforced before the 
increasing social conflict in the rural world. And it therefore gave rise to the confluence of 
interests between the great land proprietor, the Catholic Church, and the State in the 
promotion and reinforcing of the Catholic Trade Unions and the agrarian cooperativism. The 
last topic seems to be considered as a useful tool to restrain the penetration of the 
denominated "dangerous ideologies" - socialism, anarchism and republicanism - between the 
modest farmers. 
The economic direction of this movement went fundamentally towards the common 
purchase of the agrarian inputs - especially chemical fertiliser and the financing through 
different entity types. As well as other activities like the export of certain productions 
developed in the Mediterranean area, the industrial transformation of some productions - 
warehouses, dairies and butter-shops, vegetal conserves, flour factories, textiles companies, 
etc. -, the agrarian insurance, the specific technical instruction for the agriculturists, etc. 
The credit cooperativism under different formulas was implanted from the end of the 
1890, reaching a greater development from the 1920 through organisations that depended on 
(1) federations of unions and their own unions, (2) independent small farm loan banks and (3) 
                                                          
7 A critic very guessed right is in S. Garrido (1996), pp.  
8 For a detailed study on this subject, see S. Garrido (1996), pp. 69-80 and N. Noguer (1915; 1916). 
9 For the commentaries contained in the Memorias de la Dirección general de Agricultura: (1926), p. 5-6 
and (1917), p. 154, where it is recognized that the uncertainties introduced to the application of the law of 
1906 "had caused very serious disturbance in the Trade Unions and the created Small Farm Loan Banks 
operating and they prevent the formation of new organisms” (“causado gravísima perturbación en el 
funcionamiento de Sindicatos y Cajas rurales creados e impiden la formación de nuevos organismos”). 
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specialised savings banks. Nevertheless, the set of organisations did not generate their own 
organisms of co-ordination or independent central banks that provided and canalised the 
cooperative resources, as it had happened in Germany, Belgium or Austria. Neither had it got 
to count on the State support, as it happened in France. For all this reasons, the growth of the 
credit cooperativism was limited and its weight was minimal in the Spanish financial system. 
In fact, the capability to lend money was limited, because the financial entities did not manage 
to catch all the saving generated in the countryside / farmland, being less effective than the 
savings banks. The technical structures were very basic and the training skills of the 
cooperative staff were also imperfect. Yet, in spite of these deficits, the simplicity of the 
operations and its specialisation throughout those years as “microcredit organisations” 
reached relatively considerable levels of effectiveness. 
Nevertheless, it is precise to indicate the presence of a certain number of bank entities that 
obtained an important development composed fundamentally by proprietors. This was the 
case of some establishments in the province of Badajoz, or in the Mediterranean Area where 
the partners were landlords that rented parcels in the orchard.  
This work aims to analyse the development of the agrarian cooperativism of credit in 
Spain during the first third of the 20th Century. The study focuses on establishing the 
organisational models that influenced the constitution of the first credit cooperatives; the 
specific adaptations done to adjust them; the phases of implantation and types of organisms; 
as well as the territorial distribution of this associative experience. Also we will study the 
financial functionality of the small farm loan banks and its technical-organisational problems. 
Finally we will analyse the performance of the State with respect to the promotion of the same 
ones. 
Section 1 focuses on the introduction of the agrarian cooperativism of credit in Spain 
between 1890-1910, analysing the models used and the way the agriculturists and their 
organisations spread. Also it details the main obstacles the first cooperatives had to confront 
to obtain their sustainability, and what factors prevented a greater development of this entity. 
We will draw up a quantitative approach: the number of financial organisations and financial 
results. Finally we will approach the confessional cooperativism. 
Section 2 focuses on the process of developing the small farm loan banks between the 
years 1915-1934. We have elaborated a panoramic view of the implantation of the 
organisations, aiming to explain the territorial distribution, and comparing the Spanish case 
with the European context. To describe the factors that conditioned the growth of this 
financial entity we have used the microanalysis of the successful saving banks from different 
points of view (taxonomy of partners, resources, financial technologies, etc.). The funding of 
this type of cooperatives constitutes another topic: we will concrete the models of funds 
supplying and explain the role of several public banks and the private specialised ones. To 
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conclude, we will comment some considerations on the role played by the State in the 
promotion of the rural financial services. 
This paper will constitute a first approach to a very unknown field in the Spanish 
economic historiography of the last decades. The rural credit cooperatives will constitute one 
of the agents of the innovation and the technical change in the Spanish agriculture of the first 
third of the XX century. 
 
2. SOME INITIAL REFLECTIONS 
It could be important making a question before to start the study: why was it so difficult to 
expand a supply of rural financial services in Spain? All the official information of that period 
showed the preoccupation by the lack of access of the agriculturists to the formal financial 
services and by the hard conditions of the informal finances (f.e., the high interest rates). The 
answer of this situation incorporated two central elements:  
- The bankers were too conservative. They were not interested in the agricultural credit 
(by its risks) and did not consider it as a good business to lend money to the poor farmers. 
- The private moneylenders received so exorbitant interest rates that actually the small 
rural debtors were driven into the hands of exploitative usurers and other unscrupulous 
lenders (B.G. Carruthers; T.W. Guinnane; Y. Lee, 2005). 
These two explanations, apparently different, had a common element: the will. The 
problems of the rural finances were attributed to the indifference of the private commercial 
bankers and to the bad will of the informal moneylenders. The bankers did not want to take 
care of this type of customer; the moneylenders looked for exploding him. 
Having observed this diagnosis, the State was forced to assume the responsibility to 
correct the failures of the money market. The answer of the Administration consisted in 
looking for benevolent agents that offered these services without exploding to the clients. In 
our country these agents were the Banco Hipotecario de España (Real State Official 
Mortgage Bank of Spain), the Banco de España (Central Bank of Spain), the  Pósitos, the 
Servicio Nacional del Crédito Agrícola (National Service of the Agricultural Credit) and, in 
another way, the agricultural cooperativism (Law of 1906). The agents who directly depended 
on the official action were an absolute failure, because their funds were manifestly 
insufficient, and even turned aside their target. 
But the official diagnosis ignored the real difficulties of offering financial services to rural 
customers. The situation was not that the private banks did not want to lend in the 
countryside, although it was a good business. The banks and the bankers knew that with the 
traditional banking technologies this activity was not profitable for them, because the costs 
and the risks were more elevated than the profits, taking into account the substantial 
difficulties to produce rural financial services. The wrong assumption of the Government was 
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to consider it as a “will problem” and not as a “difficulty one”, so the only thing that needed 
was a right legislative intervention and the takeoff of public financing guidelines. 
The State intervention during this period could not make disappear some of the king-sized 
obstacles. Per se, the simple good will of the State neither removed the stumbling blocks that 
limited the development of the financial transactions in the rural areas, no eliminated the costs 
that stopped surpassing those difficulties. The border of the rural finances could not be 
expanded only with decrees and laws. 
It was not only a political problem, but also a technical question. There had to be found a 
way to produce specialised financial services for a reasonable cost. The solution was not, 
therefore, in obtaining political supports, but developing technology (a production function) to 
get positive results. In summary, the failure of the options devised by the State came to try 
exclusively political solutions for a problem that also was technological. The limited 
development of the credit cooperatives (small farm loan banks) and the savings banks that did 
not have a determined official support led to stop innovating actions and technologies in this 
field. 
 The obstacles to surpass were of such magnitude that the efforts made by the 
cooperativism were insufficient to reach an important development of the rural financial 
markets. Some of them were:  
? The monopolistic power exerted by the local moneylenders in some areas of the country 
? The impossibility to diminish the transaction costs (by the difficulties to obtain information 
about the customers, the problems of the “adverse selection” and moral risk, etc…) and 
other reasons to surpass the market imperfections 
? The bureaucratic failures, due to a confused and biased legislation 
? The insufficient number of agencies 
? The failures of the collective action 
? The consequences of a deficient institutional infrastructure, the effects of the covariance in 
the risks and the consequences of the high fixed costs due to an elevated fiscal pressure 
 
3. ORIGENES OF THE AGRARIAN COOPERATIVISMO OF CREDIT 1890-
1910: THE IMPLANTATION OF MODELS. 
Agricultural cooperation got underway in Spain at relatively late date. The first Spanish 
cooperatives appeared in the 1890s, and they mushroomed after the enactment of the 1906 
Agrarian Syndicates Act, which granted them tax advantages, although not all cooperatives 
were governed by this law. Official statistics provide information10 about the types of agrarian 
                                                          
10 Between 1912 and 1934 the Administration Publisher several sets of statistics on agrarian cooperation. 
Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria, 1912; Dirección General de Agricultura, 
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societies that appear in Table 1; it was not uncommon for all of them to perform cooperative 
functions, specially the “cajas rurales” and the agrarian syndicates. 
 
TABLE 1. AGRARIAN ASSOCIATIONS IN SPAIN (1910-1926) 
 1910 1916 1919 1923 1926 1933 
Agrarian syndicates 1.559 1.754 3.471 5.180 5.821 4.266 
Cajas rurales (rural cooperatives of credit) 384 496 514 499 501 646 
Farmers communities 85 100 124 123 133 166 
Agrarian chambers 100 101 126 126 128 - 
Agrarian associations - 605 857 987 1.009 - 
Agrarian federations - 24 54 78 86 - 
Source: Ministerio de Fomento, Memoria para 1910; Dirección General de Agricultura y Anuario Estadístico de 
España para 1916, 1919, 1923 y 1926 y Ministerio de Agricultura para 1933. 
 
The “cajas rurales” (small rural savings banks or small farm savings banks) were rural 
credit cooperatives and usually had fertiliser and machinery sections. Certain Farmers´11 
communities and some Agrarian chambers did the same. The latter were semi-official 
institutions -created thanks to a legal provision of 1890 - which acted as a pressure group. 
Many of the institutions the statistics referred to as Agrarian associations were cooperatives 
motivated by socialists, anarchists or republicans who, believing that the 1906 Agrarian 
Syndicates Act provided a conservative-oriented interclassist model of cooperation, refused to 
follow this legal course on ideological grounds. The Agrarian Federations that consisted 
mainly of agrarian syndicates acted as second degree cooperatives, but even those that 
basically consisted in Chambers, Farmers´communities or Agrarian associations made 
numerous attempts to channel the purchase of fertilisers, insecticides or machinery produced 
by federated bodies, as they understood that this was the only way to avoid becoming merely 
nominal organisations. 
 
3.1. THE SPANISH RAIFFEISEN MOVEMENT: THE FIRST OF THE SMALL FARM 
LOAN BANKS. 
 The initial diffusion of the agrarian credit systems and, more specifically, the small farm 
loan banks inspired by the F. W. Raiffeissen model was disseminated by Joaquin Diaz de 
Rábago12. Between 1883-1891 the Spanish economist published several works on the subject 
                                                          
11 Created under the provisions of the 1898 Rural Police Act, they had bodies of rural guards and their 
duties included the conservation and improvement of the country lanes. 
12 Diaz de Rábago was the first Spaniard who studied in detail how in some European countries the 
cooperativism movement was the suitable way to provide farmers´ loan to modernise the agriculture 
sector, and the possible adaptations to the Spanish condition. His first approach to the topic was 
developed in El Crédito Agrícola (1883), an official report done for the Ministry of Agriculture request. 
In 1886 he wrote a proposal of a law project on the cooperative societies. His proposition was supported 
by the Minister of Public Works E. Montero Ríos, a liberal politician, but finally it was not approved. The 
lank of an intellectual argument about the possibilities of the cooperatives in Spain among the hortodox 
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that had been welcomed foyr the abroad intellectuals. Nicholas Fontes Alvarez de Toledo put 
the first application of the Raiffeissen cooperatives into practice in 1891. He devised an 
adaptation of the Darlehnskassen system in Murcia that became the Caja Rural de Ahorros, 
Préstamos y Auxilios de Javalí Viejo (Small Farm Loan Saving Bank, Loans and Help of Javalí 
Viejo). His model was inspired by the pattern of organising the German Catholic Centre of 
Westfalia (Association of Westfalia Farmers). This type of saving banks had an ample diffusion 
in the localities of the Murcia´s orchard. They regarded themselves as an institution aimed to 
avoid the conflict between the land-tenants and landowners and, moreover, to restrain the 
propaganda of the socialists and anarchists ideas among the peasants. In 1898 the Fontes model 
was implanted in 8 localities, with a total of 2,350 partners. In 1900 Fontes credit cooperatives 
was settled in the provinces of Albacete (Chinchilla, Pétrola, Fuanteálamo, Corral-Rubio, 
Bonete and Tobarra), Granada, Alicante, Badajoz and Malaga. Besides, the Fontes thesis had 
even been introduced to the Diocesan Seminaries of Murcia and Badajoz through the bishops. 
Fontes Financial Institutions offered loans at low interest rates and in clear conditions to the 
poor farmers (small renters, very small proprietors and day labourers) to acquire land properties. 
The plot of land was acquired directly by the organisation that established a contract with the 
cooperative member up to ten years. The partner interested in buying the land had to amortise 
every year the tenth part of the value and a five percent interest rate of the remaining capital. 
The credit institution also acted to avoid the compulsory commercialisation of the silk cocoon, 
an important source there. All the partners sold the production to the cooperative, and the last 
one sold it again at the best prices in the most advisable markets. 
 Luis Chaves constituted the following model of saving bank organisation. In 1902 he 
found a group of small farm loan banks (Zamora, San Marcial, Moral of Vino and Arenillas) 
following the pure model of Raiffeissen. The same ideas were also disseminated by a group of 
priests (Anacleto Orejón, Gregorio Amor and Valentin Gómez) who founded a year before (in 
1901) a small farm loan bank in Amusco (Valencia). Chaves leadership had a considerable 
impact, because his model would later be adopted by the Confederación Nacional Católica 
Agraria (CNCA)13 for its agrarian unions and small farm loan banks as independent or as credit 
sections of each union. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(liberal) economists caused that Diaz de Rábago started to look for foreign intellectuals who shared 
positions and ideas with12. He was invited to the IVe Congrès des Sociétés Françaises de Crédit 
Populaire (Lyon, 4 to 7 of May of 1892) by L. Durand (main diffuser of the Raiffeisen credit 
cooperatives in France and president of Union des Caisses rurales et ouvrieres à responsabilité illimitée). 
There he presented the study Bases essentialles d´une loi sur les sociétés coopérativas. Díaz de Rábago 
was the first Spanish member of the International Cooperative Alliance12. The president of the 
association, H.W. Wolff, asked Rábago to write a paper on the origin, development and present situation 
of the cooperation movement in Spain (History and present situation of the Cooperation in Spain, 1895). 
13 Agrarian Catholic National Confederation. 
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 Between 1903-1904 the Raiffeissianism became established in Navarra by the 
Agricultural Saving Bank of Tafalla, founded by Atanasio Mutuberría14. The following initiative 
was in Olite, a Savings and Loans Bank founded by Victorio Flamarique in 1904. Between 
1904-1907 priests V. Flamarique and A. Yoldi started out an active propagandist campaign in 
the Navarra towns and settled small loan banks in several localities15. The fast spreading process 
turned to Navarra into a Spanish region with a great presence of the Raiffeissen organisations, 
as it could be seen in the following table (Table 2.-). 
TABLE 2. IMPLANTATION OF DENOMINATIONAL AGRARIAN COOPERATIVISM AND RAIFFEISSIANISM IN 
NAVARRA, 1907-1910. 
1907 1908 1909 1910 
Parish Cajas 
Rurales 
Towns Cajas Rurales Towns Cajas Rurales Towns Cajas Rurales Towns 
Aoiz 12  37 144 31 129 40 157 
Estella 22  42 96 44 93 49 96 
Pamplona 12  26 77 25 129 29 135 
Tafalla 13  19 23 19 23 19 23 
Tudela 4  6 6 6 6 6 6 
Total  63  130 346 125 380 143 417 
 
Agrarian 
Syndicates 
Towns 
Agrarian 
Syndicates 
Towns 
Agrarian 
Syndicates 
Towns 
Agrarian 
Syndicates 
Towns 
Aoiz 9 44   17 103   
Estella 15 42   18 98   
Pamplona 13 45   18 91   
Tafalla     2 2   
Tudela         
Total  37 130 57 250 55 294 57 250 
Source: Antonino Yoldi, Sexta Semana Social, 1916 (quoted by E. Majuelo and A. Pascual (1991), p. 48) 
 
 The success of this initiative resided in the received support of the local clergy, the 
bishopric and, in some cases, the landlords. The creation of a Diocesan Board and the 
development of a structure with a co-ordination in three levels (local, district, and province), 
elaborated by A. Yoldi, favoured the consolidation of these financial foundations. Thus, in 1908 
there were already 130 agrarian credit cooperatives (with presence in 346 towns) with more than 
14,000 families associated. The previous entities were connected to 57 agricultural unions (that 
grouped 5,600 partners). The Navarra cooperatives became pioneers in the distribution (as well 
as in propaganda) of the chemical fertilisers through purchases in common of all the cooperative 
members. This fact reinforced the good acceptance of the cooperatives among the farmers of the 
province. In 1910 more than half of the Navarra councils (143 from 269) had their own small 
loan bank. The process of creating a co-ordinating organisation among the cooperatives was 
                                                          
14 On this entity, see Antonio Salvador (1988), “La Caja Agrícola de Tafalla, primera cajas rural de 
Navarra, 1902”, Primer Congreso General de Historia de Navarra “Príncipe de Viana”, p. 425-433 
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finished by the foundation in the same year of the Social Catholic Federation of Navarre, the 
most solid raiffeissianist core in Spain then. 
 Another important nucleus arose in Badajoz (Extremadura)16, impelled by Tomás Marín 
(a director of the branch office of the Banco de España - Central Bank of Spain - in Badajoz). 
He established several small farm loan banks with the characteristics of the unlimited liability 
and the dividends exclusion. However it could not be considered a pure application of the 
Raiffeisen system, because the partners had to pay the monthly quotas. This kind of partnership 
did not limit itself to acting as savings and loans banks, but that also conducted secondarily 
operations of the agricultural unions (a purchase of farm implements, reproductive animals, 
seeds, chemical fertiliser, deposit and sale in common of harvests, rural day-care centre, 
insurance and conciliation). Their specificity came from the fact that this system was formed by 
a group of great landowners that contributed to the social capital with important sums of money. 
The set of the Badajoz rural financial institutions would be the most capitalised small farm loan 
banks of the country throughout the period. The first initiative of the group was called the Rural 
Saving Bank of Cantos y de Cabeza de Buey in 1905. From the very beginning it used the most 
innovative techniques, procedures and financial products, f.e., the current accounts with a 
guarantee mortgage (that it became in the main modality of loan). 
 The great solvency and banker’s references reunited by the Badajoz organisations 
gained them the support of the Banco de España. The group entered the financial entities that 
obtained greater credits from the Spanish Central Bank, lending the capitals to an interest that 
ranged between 5.50 and 7 %, when they obtained the money at 4.50 % with the guarantee of 
their partners (see table II). 
TABLE 3. INITIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SMALL FARM LOAN BANKS OF SAVINGS AND LOANS 
(RAIFEISSEN SYSTEM) OF THE BADAJOZ PROVINCE, 1906-1911. 
 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 
NUMBER OF “CAJAS RURALES" 9 14 20 24 24 24 
TOWNS INCLUDED 24 40 49 63 63 63 
NUMBER OF PARTNERS 1.519 3.012 4.582 5.739 5.941 5.974 
SHARED IN COMMON CAPITAL (SHARE 
CAPITAL) ptas. 
40.245.106 84.478.784 134.483.480 157.064.788 161.349.675 161.933.220 
PERSONAL 332.037 834.594 1.199.438 1.343.681 1.354.887 1.415.621 
PIGNORATIOUS  24.945 143.364 203.063 180.829 219.591 
HYPOTHECATING/ 
MORTGAGE 
717.167 2.530.441 4.591.627 6.395.530 7.173.575 6.943.098 
L
O
A
N
S 
(p
ta
s)
 
TOTAL LOANS 1.049.244 3.389.980 5.934.429 7.942.274 8.709.291 8.578.310 
BUILDINGS AND PUBLIC FUNDS (ptas).   141.370 434.060 716.056 829.350 
BALANCE IN THE SAVINGS BANKS (ptas) 59.200 760.477 1.720.026 2.817.165 4.089.173 4.417.732 
                                                                                                                                                                          
15 The development of cooperativism in Navarra was studied by E. Majuelo Gil and A. Pascual Bonis 
(1991). 
16 On this group, see: Asociación de Agricultores de España (1911): Memoria del Segundo Concurso de 
Asociaciones Agrícolas, Madrid. Also Narciso Noguer (1913), p. 511-512. 
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DEBITS IN THE BANK OF SPAIN (ptas) 1.323.510 3.090.429 4.326.019 5.556.346 5.183.813 4.815.992 
RESERVE FUND (ptas) 11.033 72.941 158.254 222.909 308.540 389.105 
Source: Asociación de Agricultores de España (1911), Memoria del Segundo Concurso de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Madrid. 
 
 In 1909 the confessional small farm loan banks under the Raiffeissen System ascended 
to 37317. Most of them introduced new work functions as proper savings banks. The previous 
modification demanded small contributions for the share capital (generally it was 10 pesetas, 
made effective by the partners in shares). This type of cooperatives slowly developed between 
1901 and 1906 because of non-legislative measures that favoured them. The Law of 1906 and 
its regulations of 1908 activated their growth, but the fiscal exemptions promoted by these 
norms were systematically obstructed from the Ministerio de Hacienda (Ministry of the 
Finance) and especially from the Dirección General de Timbre18. The consequence was the 
increased prices in the operations of the saving banks. This fact provoked the organisations to 
make up the lower class members (small cultivators, day labourers, etc.) who had difficulties to 
establish their own credit cooperatives. In 1909 the Magazine La Paz Social published a statistic 
on the catholic credit entities elaborated by Innocent Jiménez (Table 4). 
 
TABLE 4. EVOLUTION OF THE CATHOLIC COOPERATIVISM 1904-1909 
Fecha 
NUMBER OF 
AGRARIAN 
SYNDICATES 
NUMBER OF 
CAJAS 
RURALES 
01.01.1904  38 
01.01.1905  50 
01.01.1906 6 80 
01.01.1907 50 112 
01.01.1908 187 250 
01.07.1908 300 - 
01.07.1909 450 373 
Source: Inocencio Jiménez (1909): “Los sindicatos agrícolas” y 
“Las cajas rurales católicas”, in La Paz Social, pp. 169 and 241 
 
 Many of these first cooperatives, especially those that worked like agricultural unions, 
had an ephemeral life due to (1) the legal difficulties to constitute themselves legally and (2) 
their limited capitalisation. The credit cooperatives life that managed them to constitute a 
federation and a central saving bank, aiming to obtain a certain technical development in their 
                                                          
17 Inocencio Jiménez (1909), p. 241. Also, Vizconde de Eza (social catholic leadership) and the president 
of Asociación de Agricultores de España said: “Pudiéramos decir que todas las asociaciones de crédito 
se van fundando en España sobre la base de la responsabilidad ilimitada, principio que no asusta tanto 
como pudiera creerse, y que en cambio, evita a los agricultores que carecen de metálico la necesidad de 
suscribir acciones de capital social, que constituiría para ellos una dificultad casi invencible”, 
Asociación de Agricultores de España (1911), p. 24 
18 This question will became damaged on the “Cajas Rurales”. See Luis Chaves (1906), p. 74 y ss. 
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internal organisation, as it happened in the case of Navarra, or in the grouped land proprietors of 
the organisations from Badajoz, Tarragona or Baleares. 
 The general situation of the development of the Spanish cooperativism towards 1910  - 
according to a report of the Ministry of Public Works and Economy 19(see Table 4) - , displayed 
a predominant geographic implantation in the centre of the country, mainly in Aragón (23,9 % 
of the total of existing credit cooperatives), Navarra (23.4 %), Castilla-Leon (15,3%) and 
Extremadura (14,9 %). Among these regions concentrated 82.9 % of the huge variety of saving 
banks of that time. The territorial distribution was related to the work made by the organisms of 
the Social Catholicism. 
TABLE 5. IMPLANTATION OF CATHOLIC AGRARIAN RAIFFEISSIANIST COOPERATIVISM 
IN 1910 
REGIONS 
AGRARIAN 
SYNDICATES 
Cajas Rurales 
Andalucía 67 12 
Aragón 11 151 
Asturias 3 - 
Baleares 16 11 
Canarias - - 
Cantabria 5 - 
Castilla La Mancha 44 5 
Castilla León 138 79 
Cataluña 84 30 
Extremadura - 77 
Galicia 23 - 
Madrid 7 - 
Murcia 6 - 
Navarra 55 121 
País Vasco 28 3 
Rioja 7 3 
Valencia 70 24 
Total España 564 516 
Fuente: Elaborado a partir de Ministerio de Fomento (1910) 
 
3.2. THE PROBLEMS OF THE FIRST CREDIT COOPERATIVISM. 
During this period most of the small farm loan banks had two types of difficulties. On one hand, 
the problems referred to its internal life related to the constitution, the financial regime and the 
form and type of the management adopted. On the other hand, to the adverse relations with the 
State and other agrarian institutions.  
Regarding the first hardship, we have already described the main theoretical models known by 
the sponsor groups. The important point to select one or another model was the kind of liability 
chosen. The unlimited liability of the Raiffeissen system used to be accepted in the 
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denominational circles (Catholic magazines of agriculture, agrarian organisations, etc.), as it is 
shown in a survey of the Ministry of Public Work and the Economy of 191020. Thirty small farm 
loan banks participated in the mentioned inquiry, and all of them were favoured by “friendly 
societies”, and 28 said “yes” to the unlimited liability. This acceptance diminished among the 
agricultural unions: there were 37 participants, and only 14 defended the unlimited liability 
formula. The answers of the technicians and directors of agrarian magazines showed their strong 
rejection. For instance, Franciso Rivas Moreno21, the pioneer in the foundation of “popular 
banks” in Spain, was one of them. 
Unlimited liability became the fundamental axis of the Catholic organisations (unions and credit 
cooperatives), although in the practice was accepted under a huge variety of forms. The 
founders of a credit cooperative used to accept a strict economic criterion to such situations: 
when the cooperative was formed by very poor farmers and therefore was undercapitalised (f. e. 
the farm loan banks of Cáceres); or in case it was constituted exclusively by rich landowner and, 
therefore, they did not appear to support poor farmers (f. e. the little farm loan entities of 
Badajoz). The same principle worked in the financial entities of Navarre and Badajoz, both of 
them with majority of medium and rich land proprietors. The organisations that managed to 
subsist among their customer and associated small cultivators were almost always those 
societies that chose the limited liability, and introduced diverse types of participation in the 
share capital formation. 
Another controversial point was related to the type of operations that could be based on the 
available capital. Only a few entities could apply to external financing by a commercial bank, 
public bank or other loan corporations. The limited possibilities made nonviable the 
maintenance (and performance) of the small individual credit cooperatives. By consequence, it 
was necessary to establish federating among them and add enough guarantees to obtain funds 
with reasonable types of interest rate at the formal credit markets. At those moments this kind of 
intermediate organisations was still in an initial phase, which implied the shortage of financial 
resources. The credit cooperatives used to practice a similar set of operation done by the urban 
                                                                                                                                                                          
19 The work was Apuntes para el estudio del proyecto de ley de Crédito Agrario presentado a las Cortes 
por el Excmo. Sr. Ministro de Fomento D. Fermín Calbetón, Madrid, 1910. 
20 See: Ministerio de Fomento, Apuntes para el estudio del Proyecto de Ley de Crédito Agrario...op. cit., 
there were 346 answers: 9 Commerce Chamber, 11 Reviews, 30 Small Rural Saving Bank, 96 
Councils,18 Council Court, 37 Agrarian Unions, 14 Agriculture Chamber, 10 Province Council of 
Agriculture, 14 Province Council of Industry and Commerce, 5 Saving and Loans Banks, 70 Farmers and 
tecnnical agriculture workers. It was a representative example of the most important agents related with 
the primary sector in the country. The survey is studied by A.P. Martínez Soto (1994), pp.344-350. 
21 Rivas Moreno explained about the unlimited liability: “ En un país como España donde se hacen ahora 
las primeras experiencias con las Cajas Rurales, es poco práctico complicar la vida de estas 
instituciones con empeños muy laudables, pero expuestos a riesgos y complicaciones que podrían llevar 
a las nuevas instituciones a una situación de lamentable desprestigio...la responsabilidad ilimitada 
cuando se lleva a la piedra de toque de la experiencia, resulta de una eficacia dañosa, porque resta el 
concurso de cooperadores entusiastas y convencidos que no quieren ligarse a compromisos cuyo alcance 
desconocen...” 
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savings banks, or the popular banks created by Rivas Moreno. Any of these systems aimed to 
catch deposits that made the loan activity viable. The most solid organisations, those that 
managed to survive, among their promoters had as well several groups of landlords who 
contributed directly with initial capitals and significant money deposits.  
 
The main number of credit operations was personal loan guarantee with a multiplicity of 
variables based on the guarantees and endorsements. Moreover most of the cases were short-
term microcredit operations. Another higher quantity credit and long-term duration 
(hypothecating loans, pignoratious loans, etc.) could only be possible for the agrarian credit 
cooperatives constituted by proprietors. For instance, it happened with the credit entity of 
Badajoz that obtained an important external financing from the Banco de España (Central Bank 
of Spain). 
The technical skills and training for the staff cooperative members was another obstruction for 
the cooperative evolution. The small farm credit societies, formed by poor and illiterate farmers, 
depended on extern agents for directing them. Thus, in the Catholic organisations local priests 
would become managers, administrators, bookkeepers, directors, etc., inasmuch as the 
churchmen used to be the most skilled people in the village. In some Diocesan Seminaries the 
cooperativism got to be a subject to study for the future clergymen22. The Church instructional 
branch organised courses and seminaries, even debates (for instance, the Semanas Sociales - 
Social Weeks-) to form propagandists, management personal and cooperatives inspectors. Also 
the Church published and sponsored numerous books and pamphlets23 related to the credit 
cooperatives and their statutes, forms of operations and associations, etc., everything that could 
make easier their promotion in the countryside. 
In the lay credit cooperatives the management depended on the founding group. Thus, in the 
case of institutions sponsored by the Cámaras Agrícolas (Agriculture Chambers) the Executive 
Board used to be the Direction Group at the same time, and included the treasurer and the 
director posts. The tendency towards the profesionalization opposed the situation of the 
confessional cooperatives. When the society obtained a considerable volume of operations it 
started to contract technicians (bookkeepers and other skilled personal from the private bank or 
the commerce) that were usually supervised by the Executive Board. 
The management difficulties of the cooperatives were an important cause of the bankruptcy, and 
therefore, the lack of a bureaucratically skilled personal stopped the organisations growth. 
Related with the exogenous problems, we must mention the relations with the State. We have 
already spoken of the difficulties to obtain a specific regulation for the cooperatives, once even 
                                                          
22 In the case of Murcia it happened to the above mentioned Fontes system or in Navarre to the 
Raiffeissen system 
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the Law of 1906 was promulgated. Such a problematic access to the predicted fiscal exemptions 
constituted a brake to their expansion. In 1908 a Regulation was promulgated that tried to fix 
these aspects, although, once more the opposition of the Ministry of Treasure and the Dirección 
General del Timbre generated a stumbling block (S. Garrido, 1996). Other external problem 
was the relations that the credit institutions could establish with the financial markets in order to 
obtain funds and develop their activity. We have already commented on the limited supply in 
this sense, even though this constraint was even greater when it allude to the private banks 
specialised in the agrarian sector. The risks linked to the credit cooperatives institutions 
provoked the institutional/ official moneylenders to demand important endorsements. One little 
rural saving bank could fulfil this condition, only if big land proprietors constituted it; or in case 
it was co-ordinated and grouping with similar societies. Both cases refer to a minority number 
of organisations; most of them were led self-financing, which implied the reduction of 
companies capital and to their disappearance in the short time. 
 
4. THE DEVELOPMENT PHASE: THE SMALL FARM LOAN BANKS (1915-1934). 
 
4.1. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CREDIT COOPERATIVES AND THEIR 
IMPLANTATION 
 
Since 1915 the number of credit cooperatives stopped to grow, as much as in number of 
organisations as partners. The following table verified this fact (Table 6).  
 
TABLE 6. CREDIT COOPERATIVES: THE SPANIARDS “CAJAS RURALES” 1915-1933 
LOANS (pesetas) FUNDS (pesetas) 
 
NUMBE
R OF 
“CAJAS
” 
NUMBE
R OF 
PARTNE
R 
SHARE 
CAPITAL 
(pesetas) 
Buildings 
and public 
founds 
(pesetas) 
DEPOSITS 
(pesetas) PERSONAL 
PIGNORATI
OUS 
HYPOTH
ECATING 
LOANS 
TOTAL 
Banco de 
España 
OTHER 
ORGANIZAT
IONS 
1915 525 53.063 164.798.300 1.234.761 10.324.218 6.555.296 418.667 8.089.072 15.063.035 6.718.576  
1916 496 42.279 139.786.212 2.132.282 10.763.496 6.587.048 697.124 6.831.867 14.116.039 3.143.578 1.835.431 
1918 503 51.502 146.314.437 2.038.156 11.631.266 8.317.052 713.316 6.882.146 15.912.514 3.427.278 2.163.997 
1920 514 55.804 150.307.740 2.372.723 12.393.723 8.943.424 799.081 6.926.146 16.686.651 3.494.278 2.735.365 
1924 501 57.965 192.889.062 9.913.189 18.265.136 9.808.174 2.428.712 8.144.507 20.381.393 5.527.679 2.639.161 
1933 646 163.963   132.861.937    84.646.427   
Source: Elaborado a partir del Anuario Estadístico de España (1915, 1916, 1924) and Dirección General de Agricultura (1918, 
1934). 
 
The number of organisations kept stable around 500 with 50,000 agriculturists associated. The 
growth registered in 1933 could be explained by a change of methodology in the official 
database: the number of partners in 1933 corresponds to all people that had access to the 
financing of the cooperatives, showing that there was enough information comparing to the 
previous years. In general, the capital associated under different credit modalities was also 
stable until 1920. Between this year and 1924 a qualitative jump took place; there was no data 
                                                                                                                                                                          
23 For example the writings of Luis Chaves Arias (1906) and Luis Chalbaud (1909) could be considered a 
really textbooks. 
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information for later since 1933. And in 1933 the available current cash capital of these 
organisations was of 68.5 million pesetas. The official statistics of the basic operations (deposits 
and loans) is also very unreliable. In our opinion, the funds of the credit cooperatives were 
higher than the ones reflected in the Table. We will verify more ahead this hypothesis through 
private accounting sources of a group of institutions. 
It should be also considered the territorial distribution of the small farm loan banks taking into 
account only the years in which the statistics are relatively trustworthy (see Table 7). 
TABLE 7. RURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVES: TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE “CAJAS RURALES” AND 
HIS ASSOCIATES 1915-1933 
1915 1918 1924 1933 
Cajas Rurales ASSOCIATES Cajas Rurales ASSOCIATES Cajas Rurales ASSOCIATES Cajas Rurales ASSOCIATES  
Núm. % de total Núm. 
% de 
total Núm. 
% de 
total Núm. 
% de 
total Núm. 
% de 
total Núm. 
% de 
total Núm. 
% de 
total Núm. 
% de 
total 
Andalucía 24 4,6 1.666 3,1 11 2,2 611 1,2 11 2,2 611 1,0 29 4,5 9.111 5,5 
Aragón 53 10,0 3.436 6,5 48 8,5 5.390 10,4 46 9,2 5.394 9,3 42 6,5 16.213 9,8 
Asturias 55 10,5 2.419 4,5 31 6,1 1.951 3,8 29 5,8 1.951 3,3     
Baleares 20 3,8 2.775 5,2 19 3,7 2.897 5,6 15 2,9 3.295 5,7 19 2,9 7.736 4,7 
Canarias                 
Cantabria 2 0,4 171 0,3 5 0,9 463 0,8 5 0,9 463 0,8 52 8,0 4.325 2,6 
Castilla-
Mancha 36 6,8 1.115 2,1 30 5,9 1.696 3,3 22 4,4 1.817 3,1 48 7,4 12.648 7,7 
Castilla-
León 103 19,6 5.802 10,9 80 15,9 5.430 10,5 81 16,1 5.430 9,3 161 24,9 32.180 19,6 
Cataluña 47 8,9 3.639 6,8 53 10,5 7.308 14,2 65 12,9 9.130 15,7 105 16,2 16.178 9,8 
Extremadur
a 34 6,5 6.639 12,5 30 5,9 6.506 12,6 28 5,6 8.100 13,9 50 7,7 16.148 9,8 
Galicia 9 1,7 148 0,3 6 1,2 164 0,3 6 1,2 164 0,3 12 1,8 1.330 0,8 
Madrid 4 0,7 97 0,2 12 2,4 473 0,9 12 2,4 473 0,8 11 1,7 1.265 0,7 
Murcia 10 1,9 6.956 13,1 10 1,9 1.766 3,4 10 2,0 1.776 3,0 8 1,2 4.377 2,7 
Navarra 113 21,5 12.010 22,6 153 30,4 12.156 23,6 156 31,1 14.636 25,2 63 9,7 6.233 3,8 
País Vasco 4 0,7 406 0,7 6 1,1 880 1,7 5 0,9 934 1,6 14 2,1 5.059 3,1 
Rioja 1 0,1   2 0,3 759 1,5 2 0,3 759 1,3 5 0,7 1.027 0,6 
Valencia 10 1,9 5.784 10,9 7 1,3 3.052 5,9 6 1,1 3.052 5,3 81 12,5 30.128 12,5 
Total 525 100,0 53.063 100,0 503 100,0 51.502 100,0 501 100,0 57.965 100,0 646 100,0 163.963 100,0 
Fuente: Ibidem Table 6  
This distribution allows us to characterise a main importance nucleus by the number of credit 
institutions in the regions of Navarra, Castilla-Leon and Cataluña. Extremadura, Aragón, 
Asturias and Castilla-La Mancha formed a second group. Taking into consideration the number 
of partners, the most important centres are Navarra, Cataluña, Extremadura and Castilla-Leon. 
From the point of view of the distribution by provinces the map was more qualified/exact. It 
was obvious the cooperatives’ weigh in Tarragona (in the case of Cataluña) or Badajoz (for 
Extremadura); and also the significance in Asturias, Murcia, and even Navarra (all of them were 
regions with one-province). Considering the financial variables, the cooperative framework 
shows other aspects that could help us to understand the importance of the cooperative 
establishments. First, according to the variable “associated capital”, the most important 
organisations were in Extremadura. And throughout the period they concentrated more than 90 
% of the associated capital by the small farm loan banks in Spain. In 1915 they had 162.8 
million pesetas that makes 24,535 pesetas per partner. The second position in the ranking was of 
the societies of Castilla-Leon with 227 pesetas per partner or those of Catalonia with 169 
pesetas per member. In 1924 the credit cooperatives from Extramadura grouped 179.4 millions 
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pesetas on a total of 192 millions (for all the country). The ratio implied that each partner 
contributed 22,157 pesetas, followed from the cooperatives members of Cataluña with 15,558 
pesetas per member. 
Further information could be obtained considering the “deposit capital attracting” variable. The 
first percentage of capital again corresponded to the organisations of Extremadura, as well as 
the deposits per partner. In the second place it was Castilla-León, Navarra, Murcia and 
Valencia. The average of the impositions per partner shows – except from Badajoz – that the 
type of a dominant customer was the small farmers. The cooperatives of the last province 
(Badajoz) was an exception: (1) as much by the capacity to generate endorsements, due to the 
characteristics of unlimited liability, (2) as to catch saving- deposits in their localities, (3) and to 
develop specific loan modalities for their customers. 
TABLE 8. SITUATION OF SOME “CAJAS RURALES” (CREDIT COOPERATIVES) OF THE BADAJOZ PROVINCE, 
1918-1933 
1918 1924 1933 
Caja Rural 
YEAR OF 
FOUNDATI
ON 
CAPITAL 
ASSOCIATE 
Ptas 
DEPOSIT 
ptas 
LOANS 
ptas 
CAPITAL 
ASSOCIAT
E 
Ptas 
DEPOSIT 
ptas 
LOANS 
ptas 
DEPOSIT 
ptas 
LOANS 
ptas 
Almendralejo 1906 18.581.460 1.747.402 1.457.975 20.226.313 4.164.437 2.375.250 4.992.019 4.426.600 
Badajoz 1919    12.929.000 903.516 781.462 17.447.425 4.290.550 
Fregenal 1907 20.922.003 593.442 915.361 20.214.675 1.463.497 823.355 2.473.012 1.519.978 
Fuentes de 
León 1908 5.275.765 452.229  6.808.015 1.495.528 890.335 1.595.791 1.063.476 
Los Santos 1909 12..256.002 671.275 669.726 11.331.260 720.440 584.189 753.121 1.109.098 
Fuente Cantos 1905 6.000.000 407.576 637.481 7.681.655 864.704 625.852 20.637 253.034 
Oliveza 1908 14.482.124 936.957 1.045.843 17.128.062 991.731 976.955 3.869.785 2.986.383 
Source: Ibiem Table 7 
According to the granted loans the situation was the same as described above: only Badajoz´s 
institutions granted a credit superior than 1000 pesetas. In the other regions the average amounts 
were extremely modest, being very close to microcredit operations. In order to compare this 
hypothesis we have used original database from Dirección General de Agricultura related to 
deposits attracting and loans raising. We have tested the evolution of a set of 57 organisations24 
that approximately represent 10 % of the total in the period (Table 9). 
TABLE 9. VALUE OF THE DEPOSITS AND THE LOANS IN THE GROUP OF 57 GREATER “CAJAS RURALES”, 
1921-1934 
 DEPOSITS (ptas) LOANS  (ptas) 
1921 12.188.300 9.732.700 
1922 27.600.200 10.259.800 
1923 25.427.200 13.789.800 
1924 31.303.500 22.231.500 
1925 41.476.900 27.673.000 
1926 39.031.500 28.964.200 
1927 42.801.900 33.568.000 
1928 54.874.600 33.568.000 
1929 62.665.000 39.341.000 
1930 67.954.800 39.276.700 
1931 60.609.100 35.596.000 
1932 61.856.500 34.151.100 
1933 62.306.900 35.411.500 
                                                          
24 The datebase came from alternative sources of the Dirección General de Agricultura: Memorias y 
Cuentas Generales del Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Madrid, that published information about 
financial entities. Its truth has been pointed by serveral scholars. Also we have consulted Ceballos Teresí 
(1929). 
 17
1934 49.606.000 29.162.600 
Source: Memorias Anuales del Monte de Piedad y Caja de 
Ahorros de Madrid y Ceballos Teresí (1929) 
The values show clearly that the official statistics referred to the operations of these credit 
organisations is hardly trustworthy. During 1921 and 1934, the group of 57 loan entities showed 
values in deposits and loans higher than the total institutions that worked in Spain 
(approximately 500). Therefore it is possible that the real economic activity of the cooperatives 
needed other statistic sources. Only since 1933 the official database of the 90% of the credit 
cooperatives surpassed the mentioned group. The gap among 1921-1934 suggests statistic 
deficiency.  
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TABLE 10. ANALYSIS OF SOME VARIABLES OF THE OPERATION OF THE AGRARIAN COOPERATIVES OF CREDIT: THE “CAJAS RURALES” 1915-1933. (Amounts expressed in pesetas) 
1915 1924 1933 
CAPITAL ASSOCIATE DEPOSITS LOANS TO FARMERS CAPITAL ASSOCIATE DEPOSITS 
LOANS TO 
FARMERS DEPOSITS 
LOANS TO 
FARMERS 
REGION 
% del 
total 
Capital 
by 
“Caja” 
Capital 
by 
partner 
% of the 
total 
Deposits 
Deposit 
by 
partner 
% del 
total 
Loan by 
partner 
% del 
total 
Capital 
by 
“Caja” 
Capital 
by 
partner 
% de 
los 
Depósit
os 
totales 
Deposit 
by 
partner 
% del 
total 
Loan by 
partner 
% de  
total 
Deposit 
by 
partner 
% del 
total 
Loan by 
partner 
Andalucía  335 5 0,46 28 0,43 39 0,02 8.025 79 0,53 159 0,83 279 1,16 170 1,94 181 
Aragón    0,75 22 1,63 72 1,63 83.027 585 1,22 41 2,48 94 4,14 339 4,96 259 
Asturias    1,38 58 1,32 83 0,10 9.699 104 1,17 110 0,98 103     
Baleares    11,50 424 5,07 276 0,68 88.129 401 4,66 259 5,63 349 3,89 668 3,33 365 
Canarias                   
Cantabria    0,09 55 0,06 54    0,39 157 0,35 154 1,58 487 1,99 390 
Castilla 
Mancha    0,61 56 1,31 178 0,82 88.770 879 1,10 111 2,06 232 6,06 637 8,23 551 
Castilla-León 0,80 12.813 227 2,48 48 4,33 113 0,68 23.213 244 2,74 92 5,15 193 13,17 544 15,87 418 
Cataluña 0,03 1.110 14 2,73 76 4,10 170 7,27 255.559 1.558 3,93 79 7,00 156 5,79 476 6,72 352 
Extremadura 98,46 4790841 24.535 42,85 658 59,05 1.343 93,04 64097777 22.157 63,58 1.434 54,89 1.381 27,33 2.375 26,14 1.449 
Galicia 0,01 2.777 169     0,01 13.448 164    10 0,06 60 0,07 48 
Madrid  137 6  5 0,10 165  203 5   0,31 136 0,64 682 1,80 1.207 
Murcia 0,08 14.587 21 10,67 156 7,07 154 0,06 15.703 71 4,62 475 3,90 448 6,53 1.983 9,72 1.880 
Navarra 0,11 1.606 15 11,64 99 7,07 89 0,50 7.896 67 13,54 169 12,00 167 3,34 712 2,93 398 
País Vasco  988 10 0,13 34 0,10 41 0,04 17.866 96 0,52 103 0,13 36 2,18 573 0,72 122 
Rioja        0,05 54.003 142 0,07 17 0,47 127 0,07 94 0,19 164 
Valencia 0,48 80.794 140 14,59 257 8,29 216 0,16 63.153 103 1,87 112 3,24 217 24,78 1.093 15,31 430 
Total 100 315.111 3.118 100 192 100 285 100 479.823 3.326 100 315 100 217 100 810 100 516 
                     Source: Ibidem Table 8 
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To know the reach of the agrarian credit cooperativism in a general framework, we will compare it 
with the situation in other European countries. Table 11 allows understand the weakness of the 
Spanish movement in relation with the countries of Atlantic and Central Europe (Belgium, Germany, 
France, etc.) and even with some of the countries of Eastern Europe (Hungary). 
 
TABLE 11. SITUATION OF THE AGRARIAN COOPERATIVES OF CREDIT IN SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES circa 1925 (in 
dollars USA) 
   A. TOTAL CAPITAL B. SHARE CAPITAL C. DEPOSITS 
 
YEAR 
NUMBER OF 
COOPERATIV
ES 
BY 
SOCIET
Y 
BY 
PARTNE
R 
BY 
SOCIET
Y 
BY 
PARTNER 
% 
respecto 
A 
BY 
SOCIET
Y 
BY 
PARTNER 
% 
respecto 
A 
GERMANY 1924 22.202 87.500 94,9 8.800 9,6 10,2 69.500 75,6 79,5 
AUSTRIA 1924 1.657 42.500 103,0 1.000 2,5 2,6 40.700 93,0 93,4 
BELGIUM 1925 1.925 18.500 231,0 13 0,15 0,07 18.400 230 99,5 
CZECHOSL
O. 1924 4.807 7.750 69,5 20 0,18 0,26 7.600 68,4 98,5 
ESTONIA 1925 148 16.700 50,3 1.300 3,8 7,6 15.500 46,5 92,4 
FINLAND 1924 1.041 5.700 76,3 82,5 1,1 1,5 550 74,0 97,4 
FRANCE 1925 7.887   315 5,5     
HUNGARY 1925 1.145 7.280 20,4 1.020 2,8 16,5 25.990 16,8 80,0 
LATVIA 1925 312 14.000 61,1 1.200 5,3 8,7 12.500 54,5 89,1 
POLAND 1924 3.646 1.300 5,9 94,5 0,4 6,8 870 4,0 68,0 
RUMANIA 1923 3.747 1.980 8,6 628 2,7 31,5 1.260 5,4 63,0 
SPAIN 1924 501 60.468 522,6 55.238 477,4 91,3 5.230 45,2 9,4 
Source: Karl Ihrig (1925), p. 76. Para España: Lorenzo Muñiz, op. cit. 
 
4.2. DETERMINANTS ON THE EVOLUTION OF SMALL FARM LOAN BANKS. 
 
Some specific characteristics of the credit cooperatives caused their failure: a small size; members low 
rent level; unskilled staff, or without banking experience; a credit concession based on social linked 
relations. All of these deficiencies ended facing two basic problems: (1) how to find help of local 
institutions and (2) how to transmit their services to potential clients25. 
The small farm loan banks tried to act like financial intermediaries, tackling problems related to the 
information and the incentives26. In several occasions the problems arose when their directive staff 
committed serious managing or accounting mistakes. Another barrier was the lack of confidence. For 
the cooperatives the confidence was a question of trust in the ethical behaviour of the technical and 
directive board. In some organisations the base of the success lied in the capacity of establishing bonds 
among the members with the purpose of putting down the credit price. 
Recent studies on the agricultural credit cooperatives in Germany, Italy, Ireland or Denmark27 have 
shown a set of common dysfunction derived from their operations. The predominant activity was 
simple banking operations, generally loans; the reserves used to be higher than 90%; the passive one 
was oriented towards deposits, unlike the urban savings banks; and most of the transactions took place 
in cash and were distributed through credits. According to Guinnane (2001: 43) the previous practice 
entailed three kinds of problems: 
                                                          
25 See T. Guinnane (2001), p. 40. 
26 See Diamond (1984) theories. 
27 For Germany: T. Guinnane (1993a), (1993b), (1994a), (1997), (2001) and A. H. Kluge (1991). For Italy: F. 
Galassi (1997) and G. Muzzioli (2001). For Ireland: Irlanda (1994b). For Dinmark: T. Guinnane and I. 
Henriksen (1998). 
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a) Fraud, commonly some of the managers (especially the treasurers) used to steal the resources of 
the organisation: by robbing cash; making false accounting activities; giving credits based on 
personal criteria. 
b) Difficulties of reflecting all the input and exits (income and expenses) of capital resources in the 
accounting entries. 
c) Management mistakes derived from wrong strategic decisions generally owe to the low skilled 
financial directors.   
Putting to the reach of rural population efficient in financial services implied several elements. Firstly 
the diminution of the transaction costs. It was very difficult and expensive to accumulate 
“information"28 about potential customers. The consolidation of the associationism facilitated this task 
by grouping people where all knew one another. 
The overcome of some of the obstacles came from the microfinances practised by the credit 
cooperatives, small farm loan banks and savings banks. These institutions obtained reasonably good 
results in terms of cover and sustainability, in some regional spaces (Navarra, Valencia, Murcia, etc.). 
The “exit” allowed them to supply financial services (credit) to low-income customers. The main 
barrier that the credit cooperatives had to surpass referred to the risk estimation of anyone who had 
done the credit. To acquire additional information to improve the risk evaluation was neither easy nor 
cheap. The cooperatives that had decided on/chose the Raiffeissen system (or the Spanish version 
made by Fontes) resorted to control mechanisms among the society members. If this was considered 
excessive, the organisation did not grant the loan. 
The second factor that contributed to the (relative) success of the microfinances organisations was the 
price policy. The interest rates for the customers were reasonable and enough to cover costs and 
sustain the society. Also the financial products that started up were effective. For instance, they 
introduced a kind of a credit characterised by free availability of the funds (unlike the supervised and 
directed loan). They tried to recognise the loan fundability and measure the customers’ capacity of 
payment basing on the flow of funds of their farms. The results were highly useful financial products 
for the partners (who increased the well-being of the indebted members) and a price (interest rate) that 
allowed the permanence and the sustainability of the microfinances organisations. 
 
5. THE GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOUR IN THE PROMOTION OF RURAL FINANCIAL 
SERVICES. 
 
According to D. North29, the Official help was indispensable for the financial markets development 
and lending money to low income people in the rural areas. Without its support, the rural financial 
                                                          
28 About this topic it has been publised several writing related to microcredit institutions that stressed the 
importance of the information for their development: G. Saravalli and S. Caselli (2000); S. Lariviére and F. 
Martin (1999); C. Gozález-Vega (1998); S. Navajas (1999). 
29 D. North (1992), p. 12 
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markets had been uncompleted, fragmented, or inefficient. The theoretical function of the State was to 
make the countryside markets30 stronger and minimise: 
? The distance between debtors and money offerers. 
? The time of some operations, that implied serious risks for the survival of societies. 
? The customers’ mistrust to deposit their money in the institutions, etc. 
The Spanish Government did not develop (among 1890 and 1935) an appropriate institutional 
framework for the small farm loan banks in general and for the agrarian credit in particular. As a 
consequence it caused the prevalence of the informal markets, based on immediate transactions and 
customised directly among agents31. In many agrarian zones of the country the situation did not 
change until the Thirties (1930).  
It could be useful to summarise briefly the Public Action/Function in several points: (1) providing 
financial services to little and medium farmers, increasing the products (loan) possibilities; (2) 
decreasing the cost of the credit (interest rate), and increasing the territorial cover/range of financial 
institutions. However the successive Government of the Restauración (historic period between 1874-
1923) acted with doubts and hesitations in building a suitable institutional context32. The advantages of 
a new legislation were so limited33 that prevented the previous goals. Moreover, many interventions 
seriously harmed the cooperative organisms efficiency34. 
The role played by the Public Administration was then characterised by obtaining certain immediate 
political benefits, although they had not a significant economic effect. A right performance would 
have required, first of all, an understanding of the nature and magnitude of the Spanish agrarian 
problem. And second, a search of legal instruments (administrative and political procedures) to 
confront it. The huge quantity of unfinished Agrarian Credit Projects (innumerable from 1850 to 
1925); the adoption of erroneous financial instruments (f.e., the foundation of the Banco Hipotecario 
[Real Estate Mortgage Bank], credits granted by the Banco de España [Central Bank of Spain], etc.); 
or legislative acts that stopped the fiscal exemptions promised in the Law of 1906 were not fulfilled 
(f.e., the creation of the Caja Central de Crédito Agrícola 1918) or caused negative effects. 
Likewise, between 1890 and 1910 there were several political fights to obtain the control of the 
cooperative movement among representatives of the catholic cooperativism - supported by the Church 
- and leaders of the liberal party. The cooperativism began to be outlined like a new element of control 
                                                          
30 Timothy Besley (1992) 
31 An example is in A.P. Martínez Soto (2002) 
32 On the huge number of projects and proposals see Redonet López-Doriga (1924) and P. Carasa (2002). 
33 Law of Associations of 1887, Law of Agricultural Unions of 1906 and its Regulation of 1908, and several 
dispositions regarding to fiscal exemptions for the cooperatives - Law 1910 and the Regulation in 1911- and 
creation in 1925 of the Servicio Nacional de crédito [National Service of the Agricultural Credit] 
34 See Samuel Garrido (1998). Narciso Noguer (1912), p. 547 said: “...Vistos los tropiezos en que va dando cada 
día tumbos la ley de Sindicatos Agrícolas, ¿no sería cosa de pensar si las Cajas Rurales deberían relegarla al 
desván de las leyes inútiles, valiéndose de la ley de Asociaciones [1887]? Gozarían así, desde luego, de 
personalidad jurídica y podrían realizar sus operaciones sin miedo a que en la ocasión más inoportuna les 
sobrevenga la muerte envuelta en una real Orden... que hacen letra muerta algunos favores como el timbre y los 
derechos de aduanas...”  
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in the rural world35. In other countries, for instance in France36, the Government sponsored the 
mutualism – it was the State who supported and equipped them economically well – instead of the 
Catholic credit cooperativism, and so avoid the denominational movement growth. On the other side, 
in Spain the landlords’ opposition of any official financial initiative truncated all Government 
attempts, which remained as a multitude of drafts died in the parliamentary proceedings. The 
opposition of the great proprietors showed the limits of the State action to create an official 
cooperativism option37. 
A big problem that the Public Administration had to solve was to eliminate obstacles and reduce high 
costs of loans transaction in the rural financial markets. A general increase in the farmer families’ 
well-being constituted a good reason to justify the Liberal Government intervention in this scope, as it 
was demanded by the intellectual leadership of the agricultural credit (Besley, 1992). 
On demand point of view, the financial services in the rural areas were restricted due to the high 
transaction costs and high risks that assumed debtors and depositors; the lack of capacity of the 
farmers’ indebtedness; and the lack of true available information on the credit and deposit services. 
Several scholars pointed out that the provision of public goods by the State (education, infrastructures, 
communications, etc.) facilitates the financial services and diminishes the transaction cost for the 
indebted ones38. In this field the insufficiency of the governments investments in the Restauración 
period was well known. 
Referring to the diminution of the debtors and depositors’ risks, the Public performance must have 
turned around the creation of an appropriate regulatory legislation for the requirements of the rural 
financial markets. To settle safe markets was one of the most difficult tasks that the Public State had to 
confront and required the creation of a complex institutional infrastructure. However, as we mentioned 
before, the Spanish State did not do it. 
The third point related to the demand was the diminution of the capacity of indebtedness of the rural 
population. The weak growth of the agrarian productivity was reflected in the small capacity of 
payment of the modest farmers. In fact, several polices adopted and the urban slant in the public goods 
provision actually reduced the transaction costs and the risks of indebted and depositors, but not in the 
countryside. The State tried to start up measures to limit the risks and to favour the productive 
opportunities of the clients in the new rural financial intermediaries (credit cooperatives and savings 
banks). One of the most outstanding actions was the creation of a line of “soft credits” granted by the 
                                                          
35 Narciso Noguer, a relevante Catholic scholar said: “... En España hay otro peligro más grande. El empuje de 
la acción social católica ha conseguido turbar a ciertos políticos que más blasonan de liberales, óyensen gritos 
de odio y voces de amenaza, mal disimulados so pretexto de combatir el clericalismo, ¿quién sabe lo que le 
espera a nuestros sindicatos, cajas rurales, asociaciones profesionales y cooperativas?.¿Quién nos certifica de 
que no harán la vida imposible a las cooperativas más detestadas cuales son las rurales? Aun ahora, con una 
ley tan favorable a los Sindicatos, ¿no vemos las mil trabas y triquiñuelas con los que se los embaraza o 
deshace y que motivaron la sentida reclamación de los concurrentes a la Semana Social de Sevilla? ¿Cuánto 
mayor será el peligro si el Gobierno hostil tiene algún cable para traer a las asociaciones a su dominio 
absoluto?...”, Narciso Noguer (1912), p.239. 
36 On French experience see Madeleine Degon (1936). 
37 See S. Garrido (1998). 
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Banco de España, or the foundation of Servicio nacional del Crédito Agrícola, although these 
measures had little reach by the size of the current available capitals. 
The institutional channels were reduced, with restrictive rules of giving credits (Banco de España, 
Pósitos and Servicio nacional del Crédito Agrícola). In practice, those who had access to their loans 
were groups of landlords with political power, as it happened with the small farm loan banks of 
Badajoz (see Table 12) 
 
TABLE 12. OPERATIONS OF CREDIT OF THE BANK OF SPAIN WITH THE AGRARIAN COOPERATIVES 1903-1911 
 
A 
Number of 
borrowing 
organisatio
ns 
(syndicates 
and 
“cajas”) 
% que 
supone A 
del total de 
1903-1911 
B Granted 
loans 
Ptas 
C 
Granted 
loans to the 
“Cajas 
Rurales” of 
province of 
Badajoz 
Pesetas 
% de C 
sobre B 
% que 
supone B 
del total de 
1903-1911 
Average 
value of the 
loan 
granted by 
organizatio
n(1) 
Pesetas 
Average value of 
the loan granted to 
“Cajas Rurales” of 
Badajoz 
pesetas 
1903 9 0,9 87.561   0,2 9.729  
1904 12 1,3 205.708   0,4 17.142  
1905 38 4,1 1.067.979   2,4 28.104  
1906 96 10,4 3.592.350 1.323.510 36,8 8,1 26.078 147.056 
1907 127 13,8 5.839.271 3.090.429 52,9 13,2 24.326 220.744 
1908 147 16,0 7.228.602 4.326.019 59,8 16,4 22.854 216.300 
1909 167 18,2 8.957.457 5.556.346 62,1 20,3 23.783 231.514 
1910 162 17,7 8.933.484 5.183.813 63,9 20,2 27.171 215.992 
1911 166 18,1 8.110.196 4.815.992 59,3 18,4 23.198 200.666 
1903-11 915 100,0 44.022.612 24.296.109 55,1 100,0 20.238 205.378 
Source: Own elaboration. Information in: Informe Estadístico del Subgobernador del Banco de España D. Francisco Belda y Pérez 
de Nuevos, Madrid, 1912. 
(1): (B-C)/a-nº small saving banks of Badajoz (1906: 9; 1907: 14; 1908: 20; 1909, 1910 y 1911: 24) 
 
A half of all the credits granted by the Bank of Spain (1906-1911) went to stop Cajas Rurales de 
Badajoz (55.1 % of the lent capital). The entity was formed by proprietors who preferred to associate 
their land and by this way to obtain a solid endorsement (valued in 123,2 million pesetas on the 
average). Also, the members had important political connections that reinforced their position as credit 
plaintiffs. 
One interesting project to establish financing organisms was to settle up the Caja Central de Crédito 
Agrícola (created by Real Order of 2-X-1918), although it was not approved in the Parliament. The 
Servicio Nacional de Crédito Agrícola (SNCA, National Service of Agriculture Credit) was the first 
public institution destined exclusively for finance agriculturists. It was founded by Junta Consultiva de 
Crédito Agrícola (Real Decree 24-III-1925 law) during the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. The new 
organisation ought to lend funds to the cooperatives (unions, small farm loan banks and federations), 
as well as to the pósitos and particular farmers (see Table 13).  
 
TABLE 13. DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAPITAL LENT BY THE NATIONAL SERVICE OF AGRARIAN CREDIT, 1926-1933 
(millions of pesetas) 
TYPES OF LOANS 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
With pignoratious guarantee 5,2 15,8 30,2 32,2 23,9 18,5 13,9 17,1 
Destined to cooperative agricultural organizations 1,9 2,9 2,8 1,3 0,6 1,2 0,9 0,9 
Destined to “Pósitos” - 0,7 0,06 1,0 0,4 0,8 - 0,2 
Loans with personal guarantee 0,03 2,3 3,1 3,7 4,6 7,1 10,8 16,4 
Personal hypothecating loans - - 0,3 1,5 1,1 - - - 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
38 It is interesting to see: D. North (1992); Fleisig and de la Peña (1996); Adams, Dale, González-Vega and Von 
Pischke (1987); T. Besley (1992) 
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A. LENT TOTAL 7,1 21,8 36,6 39,9 30,7 27,7 25,7 34,7 
% de A que representa el capital prestado a cooperativas 26,9 13,7 7,8 3,3 2,0 4,5 3,8 2,7 
Source: Elaborado a partir de las Memorias Anuales del SNCA y del AEE del año 1934 
 
The capital of the SNCA did not help to make the agrarian financing more effective. In addition, the 
money for the cooperatives support had been diminished throughout the period 1926-1933. Once more 
only big landowners benefited from the money designated to agrarian associations. For instance, such 
catholic associations, as the Asociación de Agricultores de Zaragoza (Association of Farmers of 
Zaragoza), received a credit of 1.5 million pesetas in 1925. Also the catholic cooperatives, for 
example, the Católico-Agraria Federation of Murcia received 500,000 pesetas in 1926, or the 
Catholic Agrarian Federations of Galicia that got 1 million pesetas in 1926. 
On supply point of view the main problems were the following. First of all, the rural financial 
transactions faced serious difficulties due to the insufficient information that complicated the lending 
capital risk evaluation. Second, the incentives mismatch between the indebted and deserving parts 
made it difficult to estimate contracts or accentuate the possibilities of the money loaning losses. And 
finally another obstacle that discouraged the potential institutional moneylenders and restricted the 
supply was the difficulties of diluting the fixed costs of the financial infrastructure.  
 
5.1. THE INSTITUTIONAL ACTION DEFICIENCY: WHAT DID IT NOT DO? 
One better physical and institutional infrastructure would have stimulated the demand as the supply of 
financial services very much and, more concretely, the development of the small farm loan banks. The 
difficulties could be surpassed using new financial technologies that allowed, with reasonable costs, 
(1) to reduce the risk of the "moratoriums" at acceptable levels and (2) to create better economic 
societies. 
In both cases, the State’s role was important, because through the institutions development it could 
generate infrastructures that improved the information needed by the market agents. Second, it could 
lower the price of the information accumulation costs (f.e. collaborating for the development of 
accounting norms). And finally it could help to solve the problems of incentives (f.e. improving 
systems for the guarantees granting) and contribute to fulfil and reduce the monetary of contracts (f.e. 
improving the Courts efficiency). All the features attributed to the State provoked interference to the 
market, although they were necessary and add to the institutional scaffolding. 
Another proposal was related to the property rights: the legislative power must work on a better 
definition and protection of the property rights. A central point was to acquire the documentation to 
acreditate the property rights for reasonable cost so after it could be offered in guarantee39. As far as 
“real estate good”, this was obtained by reviewing the agrarian legislation that cut off the property 
right and the possibility of selling under a mortgage clause, with specific programs and with the 
creation of registries that supported the documentation of those rights (the mortgage and property 
                                                          
39 Ramos Bascuñana (1903, 1902,1910) and Pazos y García (1914, 1920) stressed the bad consequences for the 
credit related with the legislative. 
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indebted of the creditor). As far as “personal good”, the legal situation required – again - a revision of 
the legislation, and also the pignoratious guarantees and the creation of support mechanisms 
denominated "good registries"40. These registries were fundamental because of the debtors farmers 
could accede the goods easier than the lands. To be able to offer these guarantees was also necessary 
to redefine the debtors and creditors rights. All the mortgage and civil legislation was developed to 
protect the indebted against the abuses of the creditors. The asymmetric treatment, nevertheless, 
discouraged the institutional moneylenders and, in spite of the good intentions of the legislator, the 
agriculturists remained without access to the formal credit that was in the hands of informal 
moneylenders (usurers). The restrictions of usury through interest rates control (Law of 1909) could be 
considered as several examples of asymmetric rights. A peculiar manifestation of the asymmetric 
rights was the defencelessness (and even repression) of the depositors, who usually were poorer than 
the borrowers. 
As far as the financial innovation it also displayed market failures. The “novelty” usually came from 
investments in experimentation, development, transference, adaptation and learning of the new 
technologies. But the private activity did not find enough incentives to make these investments due to 
high expenses implied and the difficulty to recover them in the short time. Resulted in opening a scene 
for the State intervention, based on the support of innovation in financial technologies. The right 
question was, ‘How to do it?’ or ‘Which was the most suitable instrument for doing it?’ The 
experience of the urban microcredit institutions showed the way to follow, based on continuous 
innovation and adaptations to the characteristics of their customers. 
The funds available to most of the credit cooperatives were very limited in comparison with their 
aspirations to improve the social welfare of the small cultivators. This budgetary restriction had to 
review their interest rates policy, and look for how to increase their associated capital and the number 
of members, and manage their deposits better. As we have previously commented, the public supply 
funds had a token character and until 1925 there was not specialised organism, the SNCA, which later 
performance did not go more far away, because of its limited availability of monetary sources. 
The Government behaviour could be defined as regulating, for its great control on this financial sector. 
The importance of public goods, legal and judicial infrastructures were highly recognised, even though 
the major effort was about police actions with immediate effects. For instance, it was politically more 
attractive to announce the availability of some million pesetas to rend that to invest them in a good law 
of pignoratious guarantees. Instead of concentrating its efforts to improve the regulatory frame and 
supervise the financial intermediaries (banking and no banking) that offered deposit services, it looked 
for regulating until the smallest aspect. 
Actually, in the State performance we have not found the actions that impelled the development and 
transference of technologies, as well as a decisive support to the processes of “institutional 
fortification”. Both aspects would have managed to consolidate strong organisations, able to generate 
                                                          
40 About this topic see Fleisig and de la Peña (1996). 
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efficient and sustainable technologies. Neither it did provide funds that animated the cooperatives with 
less capacity to significant deposits that resulted that the process of cooperatives destruction did not 
stop, as it was observed during these years. Finally, a decentralised action did not take place. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The roots of the agrarian credit cooperativism in Spain were bound to the search of solutions to the 
agrarian problems in the end of the 19th century, following the guidelines of other European countries. 
The ideas and models were spread among a reduced group of experts (the work of Diaz de Rábago 
must especially be emphasised) who displayed the main currents of the German cooperativism 
(Raiffeisen, Schulze-Delitzsch and Haas systems) as well as the adaptations made in France, Belgium 
or Italy. The first agrarian associationism, hardly defined and bad organised, “copied” these proposals 
in different tendencies between 1890-1906, although the concrete accomplishments of credit 
organisations were little. These first Spanish experiences had, generally, an ephemeral life due to 
monetary restrictions. Some of these first cooperatives were constituted like small farm loan banks 
thanks to support of groups of proprietors, the Church or the local authorities. That happened in the 
case of the pioneer experiments made by Nicholas Fontes in Murcia (1891), or L. Chaves in Zamora 
(1902), or by the clergymen in Navarre (1903-1904). All of them promoted societies based on the 
Raiffeisen system. Also other models obtained a high degree of sustainability due to their promotional 
groups; thus: Agricultural Chambers, Agricultural Unions, Associations of Farmers, etc. 
The cooperatives started up during 1890-1906 had a directive staff with little experience in business 
and no one - in accounting or bookkeeping. In order to resolve these problems, they tended to 
remunerate their more essential staff personal (directors, treasurers), and tried to keep the same board 
members in the successive elections, which caused the accumulation of technical skills. 
In spite of the disadvantages that the credit cooperatives had to resolve, some of the referred 
organisations (small farm loan banks and savings banks) managed to start up micro-finances practices 
that obtained an important progress in terms of cover and sustainability. This allowed them to expand 
the supply of financial services (credit) to low-income customers. These organisations faced 
difficulties derived from the heterogeneity of the customer, which complicated the collection of 
information. The relative success of micro-finance organisations was due to their price policy, with a 
reasonable interest rates that covered the main part of the loan costs. 
The financial product designs allowed them to introduce new modalities and procedures that 
responded to their associates and clients’ demands. These products were distinguished, in many cases, 
by the free availability of the funds (unlike the supervised credits that were granted by the official 
organisations). On the other hand, the transaction costs were very low for their clients, in comparison 
with those of the official or deprived entities. Comparatively, the most successful organisations were 
those that adopted institutional designs that valued the sustainability (Raifeissen model; popular banks 
inspired in Schulze-Delitzsch thesis, several savings and loans banks or Montes de Piedad, etc.) 
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All the cooperatives that survived throughout the studied period, agreed in the use of microcredit 
technologies based on the following premises: (1) the direct bond among employees and customers; 
(2) the development of a relationship (a friendship) that became an incentive to pay; (3) the use of 
intensive procedures to obtain information about the partners and clients, which allowed to various 
guarantees to be accepted basing on parameters different from the purely economic ones; (4) an agile 
and fast resolution of the operations, thanks to a reduced infrastructure, a next location, or simple 
proceedings. Also the groups of cooperatives that managed to remain made a strict pursuit of the 
calendar of loans payments, being rigorous with the delays. This situation generated in the customer 
the belief that the “payment” was a central element for granting new loans.  
Actually, the Spanish agrarian credit cooperativism had a limited development in these years, as much 
in extension (number of cooperatives) as in capacity of financial performance. In spite of this general 
tonic, it is necessary to introduce some lights, because in certain regions their role was important to 
put within reach the agrarian technological innovations to the medium and small cultivators. The 
organisation in federations was also an important key to explain the successful, like the 
commercialised agrarian context where they acted. 
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ANEXO 4 
 
COOPERATIVISMO AGRARIO DE CRÉDITO: LAS CAJAS RURALES 
ESPAÑOLAS EN 1933 
Número de socios Capital asociado (ptas)  
Número 
de cajas Total % del total Socios/caja Total % de total Capital/caja 
Capital/ 
socio 
Imposiciones 
(ptas) 
Préstamos a 
labradores 
(ptas) 
Andalucía 29 9.111 5,5 337 1.082.513 1,6 40.093 119 1.546.037 1.649.214
Aragón 42 16.213 9,8 386 1.491.665 2,2 35.516 92 5.505.793 4.202.144
Asturias      
Baleares 19 7.736 4,7 407 5.171.823 7,5 272.201 668 5.171.823 2.824.497
Canarias      
Cantabria 52 4.325 2,6 83 600.449 0,8 11.547 139 2.106.087 1.687.877
Castilla La Mancha 48 12.648 7,7 263 2.306.096 3,3 48.043 182 8.062.090 6.968.984
Castilla León 161 32.180 19,6 200 6.198.235 9,0 38.498 193 17.505.287 13.441.741
Cataluña 105 16.178 9,8 154 14.014.277 20,4 133.469 866 7.701.333 5.695.695
Extremadura 50 16.148 9,8 323 4.957.407 7,2 99.148 307 36..314.715 22.127.138
Galicia 12 1.330 0,8 111 56.489 0,08 4.707 42 80.520 64.425
Madrid 11 1.265 0,7 115 119.259 0,1 10.841 94 863.373 1.527.205
Murcia 8 4.377 2,7 547 4.327.305 6,3 540.913 989 8.681.762 8.230.573
Navarra 63 6.233 3,8 99 1.912.685 2,8 30.360 307 4.437.927 2.480.260
País Vasco 14 5059 3,1 205 418.407 0,2 29.886 83 2.900.490 617.802
Rioja 5 1.027 0,6 361 159.528 0,6 31.905 155 97.046 169.014
Valencia 81 30.128 12,5 372 25.728.745 37,5 317.639 854 32.926.187 12.959.858
Total España 646 163.963 100 254 68.544.883 100 106.107 418 132.861.937 84.646.427 
Fuente: Elaborado a partir de Ministerio de Agricultura, Dirección General de Agricultura, Censo 
Estadístico de 1933, Publicaciones de Economías y técnica Agrícola, Madrid, 1934. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
